



HM Inspectorate of Probation

SERIOUS INCIDENTS

***Probation services' compliance
with the notification requirements of
Probation Circular 71/1998***

AN OCCASIONAL PAPER

2000

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1. Summary and recommendations

1.1 Probation Circular 71/1998 requires that the Home Office be notified of offenders under the supervision of the probation service charged with murder or other very serious offences. Since implementation very different levels of notifications have been received from services. The inspection investigated reasons for these variations. Arrangements for identifying and notifying serious incidents were examined in 14 services.¹ In eight² of the 14, probation records were compared with police and Home Office information for the period 1997/1999 to check if all incidents were being notified.

1.2 Among the eight services fully included in the inspection:

- police and Home Office records showed a total of 50 persons supervised by the probation service who had clearly been charged with a serious offence that had not been notified;
- in a further 119 cases there were indications from police records of a serious incident charge on a person under probation supervision that was not notified to the Home Office. However, in those cases police and Home Office records could not be reconciled with information from the local probation services and it was unclear either that there was a relevant serious incident charge or that the service had failed to report it;
- in some cases, imprecise probation records made it difficult to establish what information supervising officers had received about further charges.

1.3 It was also found that:

- there was no clear correlation between the proportion of unreported incidents and the general level of reporting of serious incidents;
- the majority of serious incidents that were not notified concerned offenders that were subject to a probation or combination order;
- misunderstanding or ignorance of the Home Office requirements was thought by chief officers to be the most likely reason for failure to notify, but in most of the specific cases concerned the reason was not entirely clear.

1.4 An examination of service arrangements revealed that:

- all services had located responsibility for informing the Home Office of serious incidents at chief officer level;
- there was a universal reliance on senior probation officers' (SPOs') knowledge to trigger reporting procedures, but not all were well informed about Home Office expectations;

¹ Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, Essex, Hampshire, Hertfordshire, Humberside, Kent, Greater Manchester, Merseyside, West Midlands, Norfolk, Nottinghamshire, South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire.

² Cambridgeshire, Derbyshire, Hertfordshire, Merseyside, West Midlands, Nottinghamshire, South Yorkshire and West Yorkshire.

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- there was scope to make more use of probation staff working in the magistrates' courts to provide information on offenders under supervision charged with very serious offences;
 - there were some examples of good practice that if more generally followed should result in an improvement in reporting levels.

1.5 HM Inspectorate of Probation (HMIP) concluded that, whatever the reasons, the extent of under-reporting across the services is a matter of concern. Not only does it represent a sizeable failure to follow Home Office instruction as set out in a probation circular, but leaves the service without knowledge crucial to informing its work and assessing its effectiveness in protecting the public. It also leaves the service and Home Office ill-equipped to respond to potential questions in relation to specific incidents, one of the reasons for introducing the reporting requirement. Clearly action is required to minimise the likelihood of such incidents escaping attention in future.

1.6 The inspection findings also suggested that there would be merit in the Home Office reviewing the requirements of Probation Circular 71/1998.

1.7 As a result of the findings, it is recommended that:

1. *The Home Office should:*

- (a) ensure that there is formal acknowledgement of all serious incident notifications and management reviews;*
- (b) review the provisions and requirements of Probation Circular 71/1998 and clarify the position on the issues noted in this report;*
- (c) in the future development of information technology (IT) systems, give consideration to incorporating arrangements that would help to ensure that serious incidents are fully reported. For the longer term, it would be appropriate to consider whether IT links could be developed so that services were notified of serious incidents directly from police or court IT systems.*

2. *Chief probation officers (CPOs) should:*

- (a) ensure that all supervising officers and managers are aware of the requirement to notify the Home Office when an offender under supervision is charged with murder or another very serious offence;*
- (b) ensure that court duty staff notify not only the supervising officer but also an identified manager when a person under supervision appears charged with a very serious offence;*
- (c) require an improvement in case records to ensure that they show clearly: the date the supervising officer is notified that an offender has been charged with a further offence, the source of the information and the precise nature of the charge.*

2. ***Background, aims and methods***

Background

- 2.1 Probation Circular 41/1995 first set out arrangements for probation services to inform the Home Office when offenders or defendants under supervision are charged with murder or other very serious violent or sexual offences. Services were also asked to notify “*any other offence which has attracted, or seems likely to attract, significant media interest, or is thought likely to raise issues of wider national interest*”. The system was introduced to ensure that all cases are notified because of the potential consequences that can arise when a serious offence is committed by someone for whom the probation service holds responsibility. Experience had demonstrated that such offences generated intense media interest and the responsibilities within the Home Office for responding to those events needed to be clarified. It was also recognised that there may be lessons to be learned at a local and national level or shortcomings in practice to be rectified. Immediate notification of the event was to be followed “*as soon as possible*” by a report of a management review of the case.
- 2.2 The following year a second circular was issued, Probation Circular 79/1996. That provided further guidance on the procedures to be followed by services. It included a more specific list of the charges to be reported, namely: murder, attempted murder, arson where there is an intent to endanger life, manslaughter and rape. It confirmed the requirement that services use discretion in reporting any other very serious violent or sexual offence, adding examples of “*armed robbery, assault with a deadly weapon or hostage taking*”. Offences likely to attract media interest were again included in the list. Subsequent circulars reiterated the same categories of offence. Probation Circular 79/1996 also clarified that the primary recipient of the management review was the local probation service management and, “*if necessary*”, the local probation committee. Probation Circular 71/1998 tightened the latter clause, requiring that the local probation committee should always receive a copy of the management review and not just when it was deemed necessary.
- 2.3 In 1997 and 1998 two analyses were commissioned by the Home Office of serious incident notifications and related management reviews. In addition to highlighting some common shortcomings in supervision shown by the management reviews, it was noted that there were very different levels of notifications between services. These differences had also been identified by HMIP in the course of its inspection work, although the reasons for the variations were unclear. Since the publication of Probation Circular 41/1995 there had been no examination of the procedures adopted by services for identifying serious incidents or whether variations in the effectiveness of those procedures might account for the differences in reporting levels.

Aims

- 2.4 The aims of this inspection, described in a letter to CPOs in March 2000, were:
- to ensure that probation services are implementing the requirements of Probation Circular 71/1998 regarding the notification of serious incidents by:

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- exploring whether data is available and can be obtained from criminal justice systems and/or develop a formula to use to assess whether all notifications of serious incidents are being reported
 - so far as can be determined, establishing whether there are major variations in levels which may indicate that not all serious incidents are being reported to the Probation Unit
 - if so, undertaking some examination of the underlying reasons for the variations;
 - to identify good practice points regarding the notification of serious incidents for probation services and the Probation Unit.

Methods

- 2.5 The first task was to identify, from records held in the Probation Unit of the Home Office, how many serious incidents were being notified each year by services. In order to make the task manageable, while also obtaining a reasonable picture of events over time, it was decided to examine reporting levels in a three-year period 1997/1999. The next task was to establish whether differences in levels of reporting were significant when the size of the service and other relevant factors had been taken into account. To do this, each service's "share" of total notifications was identified, together with their share of several overall measures of size used in the cash limits formula for the probation service. The latter included sentencing figures, the proportion of the population aged 15-24, young male unemployment rates and probation commencements. While these were rather limited measures to use in establishing a basis for assessing comparative reporting rates by services of serious incidents, the information was readily available and deemed to provide a reasonable "broad brush" indicator for comparison purposes.
- 2.6 A comparison was made between each service's share of the 1997/1999 serious incident notification figures and the average of the service's share of the overall measures of size. The percentage difference was then identified. While the comparisons made were approximate, they provided a rough guide as to whether a service's share of notifications was higher or lower than might be expected from its overall size.
- 2.7 A sample of 14 services was selected for closer examination. It included a mixture of services across the reporting spectrum, some showing apparently high relative levels of notifications, as well as those with lower levels. Information was sought from police records in the 14 areas, on all persons charged with a very serious offence in the relevant period.³ The information provided by the police was compared with details held in the Home Office on commencements of orders and licences. By that means, it was possible to match the names of individuals charged with specific offences with the names of those under the supervision of the probation service. Those names were then compared with the record of serious incidents notified to the Probation Unit of the Home Office and differences between the two identified. Finally, details of the seemingly missed notifications were sent to the services concerned, with a request that they be checked against information held in probation records.
- 2.8 A visit was paid to all 14 services selected for inclusion in the inspection to examine arrangements for implementing the requirement to notify serious incidents and undertake the

³ The information excluded any offences committed by a person resident in one area but charged in a second police force area, as to identify the latter cases would have been a very time-consuming task, even if possible.

necessary management review. In those services asked to investigate seemingly unreported serious incidents, the visit was also used to clarify and review the service's findings.

3. Findings

- 3.1 This chapter describes the information obtained from Home Office records on the serious incidents notified by services. It also examines the results of comparing police information on persons charged with very serious offences with Home Office and probation service records concerning offenders under supervision. Finally, it describes the procedures established in services to identify and notify serious incidents, with some examples of good practice.
- 3.2 When records held by the Probation Unit were examined to identify the number of serious incidents reported by services between 1997 and 1999, they showed a total of 891 notifications. As Appendix 1 shows, while there was some variation in numbers each year, there was no overall increase in reported incidents during that period. However, the figures reveal the very different levels of reporting between services although, as might be expected, the three largest probation services, Inner London, West Midlands and Greater Manchester, had the highest individual levels. Between them, they accounted for 30 per cent of all reported incidents.
- 3.3 Appendix 2 shows each service's share of total notifications and its share of overall measures of size. When the proportion of serious incident notifications was set alongside those measures of size, they revealed some significant variations, as shown in Appendix 3. However, in small services because of the small number of notifications, any differences need to be considered with some caution.
- 3.4 It was possible to obtain information from police records in eight of the 14 areas selected for inclusion in the inspection. That information had been requested on persons charged with the specific offences mentioned in paragraph 2.3 of Probation Circular 71/1998. However, in respect of some of those offences, the information could not be divided between charges that should be notified to the Home Office and those that would not constitute a serious incident. Thus, police records usually showed all robberies in a single category, not separately identifying those charged with armed robbery. While such generic categories may have included some cases that would have fallen within the scope of the circular's requirements, enquiries pursued in the course of the inspection, as in the figures below, related only to those charges that were immediately identifiable as relevant.
- 3.5 Across the eight areas, police records showed 169 persons charged with a very serious offence between 1997 and 1999 who were also shown by Home Office records as having been under the supervision of the probation service at the time, but these serious incidents had not been notified to the Probation Unit. In 119 of the 169 cases, the information obtained from police and Home Office records could not be reconciled with the information held by local probation services. It was not possible in the time available to investigate the reasons for those discrepancies. The information provided by services in respect of the 119 cases showed that:
- in 27, the person charged was not under the supervision of the service at the relevant time, although some were known to be serving a custodial sentence;
 - a further 10 were under the supervision of other agencies.

In these 37 cases there were apparent errors in data held on Home Office records. It was not possible to identify where all those mistakes had occurred, although in some cases it was acknowledged by services that errors had been made in their returns to the Home Office.

- 3.6 Of the remaining 82 of the 119 cases who were under the supervision of the probation service:
- in 47 cases, probation records showed the offenders were charged with a similar but less serious offence that did not require notification and there was no indication that this had been reduced from a more serious charge;
 - in 19 cases, there was no record of such a charge or any similar charge at any time while the offender was under supervision;
 - in 14 cases, it was not possible to assess from service records what information the supervising officer had received;
 - in two cases, a serious incident report had been submitted but did not appear on Home Office records.
- 3.7 In some, if not all of the 47 cases where a lesser charge was recorded, it would appear that the supervising officer never had knowledge of a more serious charge having been brought at an earlier point. Another possible explanation was that there were errors in data entry on police records.
- 3.8 In respect of the 19 cases in which there was no record of any charge, it can only be concluded that some part of the information available to the inspection was not fully accurate. Thus, it was possible that spurious matching might have occurred between different people with similar names and dates of birth, although every effort was made to avoid that. A further possibility was that the supervising officer may have been unaware of the charge. While this seemed an unlikely event, it was possible if the charge was quickly discontinued. Another explanation was that errors in police data could have occurred.

Unreported serious incidents

- 3.9 Excluding the 119 cases above where information from the different data sources could not be reconciled, the inspection identified that 50 of the 169 persons should have been the subject of a serious incident report, but this had not occurred. Expressed as a proportion of the total number of serious incidents that were notified by the eight services, 244 between 1997 and 1999, this represented an under-reporting rate of 20 per cent. Table 1 shows the serious incidents not notified by services.

Table 1: Serious incidents not notified, by service and offence type

Service	Total not notified	Murder/ Attempted Murder/ Manslaughter	Rape/ Attempted Rape	Robbery with Firearm	Arson with Intent	Kidnap/False Imprisonment/ other
Cambridgeshire	6	1	5			
Derbyshire	9	1	3	1	2	2
Hertfordshire	0	–	–	–	–	–
Merseyside	6	2	1	–	3	–
Nottinghamshire	5	1	3	–	1	–
South Yorkshire	5	2	2	–	1	–
West Midlands	12	1	8	–	1	2
West Yorkshire	7	2	5	–	–	–
Total	50	10	27	1	8	4

It reveals:

- more than half concerned charges of rape or attempted rape;

- one-fifth concerned charges of murder, attempted murder or manslaughter;
- the number of cases not notified was generally unrelated to the size of the service.

3.10 Although not specifically requested to do so as part of the inspection, a number of services had sought to establish reasons for the failure to notify. Information was not available in all cases, not least because there had been some staff movement in the interim. In most cases, records of supervision were examined to ascertain what information the supervising officer had received about the charge. There was no evidence to suggest that staff at any level had acted deliberately to withhold information. Table 2 shows the range of reasons identified by service for the failure to notify as far as that could be established and the type of order/licence to which the offender was subject at the relevant time.

Table 2: Type of order/licence and reason for failures to notify

Apparent reason for failure to notify service incident	Type of order/licence					
	Probation order	CS order	Combination order	Prison licence	MPSO	VAC
Supervising officer clearly aware of serious incident but not of requirement to notify	5	2	1	1	1	-
Supervising officer clearly aware of serious incident but reason for failure to notify unclear	12	5	5	5	-	-
Not clear if supervising officer aware of serious incident.	-	3	1	-	1	-
Supervision "inactive" and/or outstanding warrant for breach	-	3	2	-	-	1
Service aware of charge but clear decision that notification unnecessary	1	-	1	-	-	-
Total	18	13	10	6	2	1

MPSO = Money Payment Supervision Order

VAC = Voluntary Aftercare

The table shows that:

- the majority of incidents that were not notified involved offenders on probation or combination orders;
- only 12 per cent of the unreported incidents concerned prisoners on licence. Because a further serious offence would give rise to considering the revocation of the licence, officers may be more alert to the need to notify serious incidents in such cases;
- in over half of the cases, the record of supervision showed clearly that the officer was aware of the charge, but it was not clear why it had not been reported or indeed whether it had been recognised as a serious incident;
- in six cases supervision was "inactive", in five of that number there was an outstanding warrant for breach and in a sixth an offender supervised on VAC had not been in recent contact;
- there were two cases where the service had recognised that a serious incident had occurred but had taken a decision that it should not be notified to the Home Office. One was an assistant chief probation officer (ACPO) decision and concerned a case of involuntary manslaughter in which a drug addict had accidentally injected his

partner, also a drug addict, with a lethal overdose. The second case was a decision taken by a supervising officer.

- 3.11 Discussions with chief officers, who had led the enquiries into the unreported cases, pointed to a number of reasons why supervising officers might not have drawn charges to attention:
- because such events were relatively rare, officers may well have forgotten the reporting requirement;
 - new officers may not have been informed of the need to report;
 - most services had no clear arrangements for ensuring that CS officers were aware of the requirements of Probation Circular 71/1998 and saw this as potentially the greatest weakness in their system although the inspection found no evidence to support that view;
 - where offenders had not been seen for a lengthy period and the original order would effectively be brought to an end following conviction on the new charge, officers may have overlooked the fact that those offenders were still under the supervision of the service;
 - officers may have anticipated a likely reduction in charge and decided that a serious incident report was unnecessary.
- 3.12 Of the 50 unreported cases, probation records showed that in six cases the charge was subsequently discontinued, in another six it was reduced in seriousness and in a further six the defendant was acquitted following trial. Of the remaining 32, it is known that some were convicted as charged. Details of outcomes had not been requested as part of the inspection and the results in all cases are not known. A reduction in the charge or discontinuance does not remove the requirement to notify the Home Office of a serious incident. However, the known proportion of cases in which the charge was subsequently reduced or discontinued, suggests that there would be merit in re-examining the nature and timing of any required management review.
- 3.13 Other matters raised by the findings identified that:
- the position with respect to MPSOs would benefit from clarification. While the offender subject to such an order is clearly under the supervision of the service, the content of the contact is specifically limited to encouraging payment of the financial penalty imposed by the court. The necessity to notify a serious incident and prepare a management review in such cases needs to be considered given the responsibility of the service in such cases;
 - it would be helpful to clarify whether the requirement on services to notify when an offender is charged with a serious offence, relates to an initial charge by the police or a charge at court;
 - it would also be helpful to clarify whether services are required to retrospectively notify a charge brought while an offender is in custody, if subject to probation supervision at the time of the offence.
- 3.14 It was a curious and unexpected finding of the inspection that while the records clearly identified certain cases charged with serious offences that should have been notified to the Home Office and were not, the police records did not identify certain other serious incidents that services had notified. It is likely that a proportion of those incidents were offences committed outside the supervising probation service and police force area, though not clear whether all could be accounted for in that way.

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- 3.15 A second unexpected finding was that service records showed that two serious incidents had been notified of which no record could be found in the Home Office. While the number of cases involved is small, it is a matter of concern that the receipt of such sensitive and important information could not be accounted for. Consideration might be given to the Home Office issuing an automatic “*receipt note*” of all notifications and management reviews. In that eventuality, services would need to ensure that the receipt note was attached to the relevant case file.

Service procedures

- 3.16 In order to establish whether local procedures might play some part in the likelihood of a serious incident being notified, service arrangements for implementing the requirements of Probation Circular 71/1998 were reviewed in visits to the 14 services. Despite the amount of work involved for managers and the potential stress experienced by staff when serious incidents occurred and management reviews were undertaken, all chief officers saw the process of notification and review as an integral part of risk management arrangements.
- 3.17 Most chief officers interviewed commented on the negative publicity that followed the publication of reports by the Home Office regarding the analyses of serious incidents in 1997 and 1998. It was felt that the information provided in the management reviews had been poorly handled in the reports and had done little to enhance public confidence in the work of the probation service. Frequent reference was made to a change of attitude towards the notification system as a result. Notwithstanding that view, there was no clear evidence that it had affected the behaviour of staff.
- 3.18 Responsibility for dealing with serious incident notifications was clearly located at senior manager level in all services, the precise arrangements differing between areas. Each required that the line manager ACPO and/or deputy chief probation officer (DCPO) be notified at the earliest opportunity of any offender under supervision charged with a serious incident, although no service had any means of knowing if this was happening. As the inspection found, it would be difficult for a service to estimate, with any degree of accuracy, the number of serious incident notifications it might expect to receive over any period of time. In some areas, ACPOs periodically reminded SPOs of the requirement and asked them to check with teams that all incidents had been drawn to attention, but beyond that felt there was little they could do to test for compliance. On occasion an incident that should have been notified was later picked up in the course of staff supervision or a case record inspection.
- 3.19 In most services, it was the duty of the line manager ACPO to inform the Home Office of a serious incident, although in one service the DCPO performed that task and in another the ACPO with functional responsibility for risk management. The process of notification was usually triggered by the supervising officer alerting the SPO or CS manager to an incident. In examining possible reasons for non-notification, a key question to be addressed was how the service ensured that supervising officers and court duty officers were familiar with the requirement to notify serious incidents.
- 3.20 All services had drawn to attention the requirements of relevant probation circulars. Some had issued further local advice and instruction on the procedures to be followed when a serious incident occurred. No service had attempted to offer further advice on what constituted “*other serious sexual or violent offences*”, but expected staff to consult if in any doubt. It was not always clear how new staff would be made aware of the circular requirements. While they were

advised how to access copies of probation circulars and service policy documents, chief officers seen in the course of the inspection could not always confirm whether the requirement to notify serious incidents would be covered in induction training. However, and commendably, one service had an induction arrangement that included a checklist of policies that had to be “signed off” as each was covered in supervision. The policy relating to risk procedures included the notification of serious incidents.

- 3.21 Most services relied heavily on the knowledge and guidance given by middle managers to ensure that procedures in relation to notifying serious incidents were followed. Chief officers thought that, because of their nature, serious incidents came to the attention of the line manager very quickly but, as the inspection found, there was a range of circumstances where this was less likely to happen. Furthermore, as some services had already recognised, not all SPOs were necessarily well informed of Home Office requirements. The inspection clearly showed some misunderstanding among supervising officers.
- 3.22 In all the services, court duty staff had a responsibility to inform the supervising officer of the outcome of any court appearance involving an offender under supervision but not, in most cases, a responsibility to alert their line manager to a serious incident. In many cases the information provided by court duty staff was likely to be the first news the supervising officer received of an incident, although sometimes police/probation liaison arrangements could trigger an earlier alert. There were various reasons why the court duty staff may not be aware that a defendant charged with a serious incident was currently under supervision. While the court list was checked, the thoroughness and completeness of the check was influenced by several factors. Thus, in at least one service, there was no access at local level to a central index of offenders known to the service. Court duty staff could only check local names. Even where information was accessible, court duty staff may not be aware of an offender’s appearance. The case might not be listed and, if the duty officer was not in court at the relevant moment, the appearance may well pass unnoticed.
- 3.23 In only two services were the administrative staff responsible for court work required to enter, on to the Case Record Administration and Management System (CRAMS) database, information taken from the court list. In the course of investigating why a number of serious incidents had apparently gone unreported, the two services concerned initially checked case records. In six of the cases, although the case record did not reveal that the offender had been charged with a serious incident, when CRAMS was checked, the relevant information was found. It was not possible to discover whether the supervising officer had been notified and failed to record the information or had not been notified. There would clearly be benefit in making greater use of court duty staff to bring serious incidents to the attention of managers. It would also be helpful for the Home Office to give consideration, in any further development of IT systems, to incorporating arrangements that would help to ensure that serious incidents are fully reported. For the longer term, it would be appropriate to consider whether links could be developed so that services were notified automatically of such incidents directly, from police or court IT systems.

Good practice

- 3.24 Although services generally relied on the same systems for the notification of serious incidents, the inspection identified some procedures that, if adopted more widely, should help to improve practice generally:

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- the development of succinct practice guidelines on reporting requirements and procedures;
 - providing new officers with a checklist of policies, including that relating to serious incident notification, to be “*signed off*” as each was covered in induction training, was a commendable way of confirming what information newly appointed staff had received;
 - the requirement for court administrative staff to enter on CRAMS details of court appearances for serious offences provided a useful second source of information in some services. If the requirement was extended to copying the information to both the supervising officer and identified manager, it should help to reduce the number of “*missed*” cases.

Conclusions

- 3.25 Not all serious incidents were being reported, but there was no evidence that staff of probation services were deliberately withholding information from CPOs or from the Home Office. The majority of cases that had not been notified were probably due to oversight or misunderstanding.
- 3.26 Whatever the reasons, the extent of under-reporting across the services is a matter of concern. Not only does it represent a sizeable failure to follow Home Office instruction as set out in a probation circular, but leaves the service without knowledge crucial to informing its work and assessing its effectiveness in protecting the public. It also leaves the service and Home Office ill-equipped to respond to potential questions in relation to specific incidents, one of the reasons for introducing the reporting requirement. Clearly action is required to minimise the likelihood of such incidents escaping attention in future.
- 3.27 While it was not within the remit of the inspection to examine the broader workings of Probation Circular 71/1998, it was apparent that implementation involved a considerable amount of management resource. It would be timely to review the provisions in the light of experience and determine whether, without prejudice to public protection and Home Office “*need to know*” of serious incidents, there might be scope for modification to some of the requirements.

Appendix 1

Notification of serious incidents, by area

Area	1997	1998	1999	Total
Avon	2	2	3	7
Bedfordshire	3	6	2	11
Berkshire	6	3	6	15
Cambridgeshire	7	8	6	21
Cheshire	10	6	5	21
Cornwall	0	2	1	3
Cumbria	0	6	2	8
Derbyshire	1	2	3	6
Devon	10	6	8	24
Dorset	3	4	0	7
Durham	1	4	1	6
Essex	7	2	11	20
Gloucestershire	0	2	2	4
Hampshire	2	0	0	2
Hereford & Worcester	3	11	4	18
Hertfordshire	0	1	1	2
Humberside	2	1	4	7
Kent	10	12	8	30
Lancashire	7	11	10	28
Leicestershire	5	4	19	28
Lincolnshire	0	3	2	5
Greater Manchester	25	26	16	67
Merseyside	10	11	13	34
Norfolk	1	0	1	2
Northamptonshire	4	3	3	10
Northumbria	17	13	9	39
Nottinghamshire	3	7	5	15
Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire	2	2	3	7
Shropshire	4	1	0	5
Somerset	2	0	1	3
Staffordshire	5	6	12	23
Suffolk	1	4	3	8
Surrey	3	2	0	5
East Sussex	7	4	2	13
West Sussex	1	3	1	5
Teesside	1	4	4	9
Warwickshire	0	2	1	3
West Midlands	33	36	40	109
Wiltshire	4	2	3	9
North Yorkshire	2	1	1	4
South Yorkshire	4	11	6	21
West Yorkshire	13	15	9	37
Dyfed	2	0	1	3
Gwent	3	5	6	14
North Wales	2	1	3	6
Powys	0	0	0	0
South Glamorgan	3	4	1	8
Mid Glamorgan	5	4	2	11
West Glamorgan	2	0	3	5
Inner London	28	32	30	90
North East London	0	3	3	6
South East London	1	1	1	3
South West London	0	2	1	3
Middlesex	21	13	7	41
Total	288	314	289	891

Appendix 2

Areas' share of total notifications 1997/1999, compared to other measures

Area	Proportion of total notifications	Proportion of total sentencing	Proportion of Crown Court sentencing	Proportion of population 15-29	Proportion of young male unemployed	Proportion of probation orders
Avon	0.8	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.4	2.0
Bedfordshire	1.2	0.9	0.9	1.1	0.8	0.9
Berkshire	1.7	0.9	0.7	1.6	0.6	1.0
Cambridgeshire	2.4	1.0	1.1	1.5	0.8	1.0
Cheshire	2.4	2.1	2.2	1.8	1.7	1.6
Cornwall	0.3	0.6	0.5	0.8	0.9	0.6
Cumbria	0.9	1.1	0.9	0.9	1.0	1.0
Derbyshire	0.7	1.4	1.6	1.8	1.9	1.9
Devon	2.7	1.7	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.6
Dorset	0.8	1.0	1.0	1.2	0.7	1.2
Durham	0.7	1.0	1.2	1.1	1.6	1.3
Essex	2.2	2.3	2.2	3.0	2.2	2.3
Gloucestershire	0.4	0.8	0.6	1.0	0.6	1.0
Hampshire	0.2	3.1	2.8	3.4	2.1	2.6
Hereford & Worcester	2.0	1.0	0.9	1.2	0.9	0.9
Hertfordshire	0.2	1.1	1.1	1.9	0.8	1.4
Humberside	0.8	1.8	1.9	1.6	2.5	1.8
Kent	3.4	2.8	3.1	2.9	2.5	2.4
Lancashire	3.1	3.9	3.6	2.7	2.7	3.2
Leicestershire	3.1	1.7	1.8	1.9	1.4	1.6
Lincolnshire	0.6	1.1	0.8	1.1	0.9	1.2
Greater Manchester	7.5	6.6	7.4	5.1	6.1	7.0
Merseyside	3.8	3.8	3.5	2.7	5.2	3.8
Norfolk	0.2	1.3	1.0	1.4	1.3	1.1
Northamptonshire	1.1	1.0	1.0	1.2	0.8	1.0
Northumbria	4.4	3.2	3.1	2.7	4.4	3.6
Nottinghamshire	1.7	2.1	2.7	2.0	2.4	2.6
Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire	0.8	1.6	1.4	2.6	1.0	1.7
Shropshire	0.6	0.5	0.7	0.8	0.6	0.7
Somerset	0.3	0.5	0.5	0.8	0.6	0.8
Staffordshire	2.6	1.8	1.8	2.0	1.8	2.0
Suffolk	0.9	1.0	0.9	1.2	1.0	0.8
Surrey	0.6	1.0	1.0	1.8	0.5	1.1
East Sussex	1.5	1.1	1.1	1.3	1.1	1.0
West Sussex	0.6	0.9	1.1	1.3	0.5	0.8
Teesside	1.0	1.4	1.4	1.1	2.3	1.9
Warwickshire	0.3	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.6	0.8
West Midlands	12.2	5.9	6.2	5.2	7.4	7.0
Wiltshire	1.0	0.8	0.6	1.1	0.6	1.1
North Yorkshire	0.4	1.3	1.1	1.3	0.9	1.0
South Yorkshire	2.4	2.7	3.2	2.5	3.9	3.0
West Yorkshire	4.2	5.4	5.8	4.2	5.2	5.4
Dyfed	0.3	0.8	0.6	0.6	0.8	0.7
Gwent	1.6	1.3	1.0	1.0	1.3	1.2
North Wales	0.7	1.3	1.0	1.2	1.4	1.0
Powys	0.0	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.2	0.3
South Glamorgan	0.9	1.3	1.2	0.9	1.0	1.0
Mid Glamorgan	1.2	1.0	1.0	0.8	1.3	0.8
West Glamorgan	0.6	0.8	0.7	0.7	0.9	0.9
Inner London	10.1	8.7	8.1	5.6	6.9	6.3
North East London	0.7	1.7	1.8	2.1	2.5	1.9
South East London	0.3	1.1	1.0	1.6	1.2	1.2
South West London	0.3	1.0	0.9	1.4	0.6	0.9
Middlesex	4.6	3.3	3.7	4.3	4.2	3.3

Appendix 3

Serious incident notifications compared to average of other measures

Area	Serious incidents: total 1997/1999	Proportion of total notifications (A)	Average proportion other measures (B)	% difference between (A) and (B)
Avon	7	0.8	1.7	-55.0
Bedfordshire	11	1.2	0.9	+34.3
Berkshire	15	1.7	1.0	+75.0
Cambridgeshire	21	2.4	1.1	+117.5
Cheshire	21	2.4	1.9	+26.3
Cornwall	3	0.3	0.7	-50.1
Cumbria	8	0.9	1.0	-6.3
Derbyshire	6	0.7	1.7	-61.1
Devon	24	2.7	1.7	+55.7
Dorset	7	0.8	1.0	-20.9
Durham	6	0.7	1.3	-46.6
Essex	20	2.2	2.4	-6.6
Gloucestershire	4	0.4	0.8	-45.9
Hampshire	2	0.2	2.8	-91.9
Hereford & Worcester	18	2.0	1.0	+103.0
Hertfordshire	2	0.2	1.2	-82.0
Humberside	7	0.8	1.9	-59.5
Kent	30	3.4	2.7	+23.1
Lancashire	28	3.1	3.2	-2.4
Leicestershire	28	3.1	1.7	+87.6
Lincolnshire	5	0.6	1.0	-44.2
Greater Manchester	67	7.5	6.4	+16.8
Merseyside	34	3.8	3.8	-0.1
Norfolk	2	0.2	1.2	-81.6
Northamptonshire	10	1.1	1.0	+16.5
Northumbria	39	4.4	3.4	+28.4
Nottinghamshire	15	1.7	2.4	-28.6
Oxfordshire & Buckinghamshire	7	0.8	1.6	-52.1
Shropshire	5	0.6	0.7	-15.4
Somerset	3	0.3	0.7	-48.4
Staffordshire	23	2.6	1.9	37.9
Suffolk	8	0.9	1.0	-9.5
Surrey	5	0.6	1.1	-47.9
East Sussex	13	1.5	1.1	29.1
West Sussex	5	0.6	0.9	-38.8
Teesside	9	1.0	1.6	-37.0
Warwickshire	3	0.3	0.7	-53.9
West Midlands	109	12.2	6.3	+92.8
Wiltshire	9	1.0	0.9	+18.8
North Yorkshire	4	0.4	1.1	-59.8
South Yorkshire	21	2.4	3.1	-23.0
West Yorkshire	37	4.2	5.2	-20.0
Dyfed	3	0.3	0.7	-51.9
Gwent	14	1.6	1.2	+35.3
North Wales	6	0.7	1.2	-42.8
Powys	0	0.0	0.2	N/A
South Glamorgan	8	0.9	1.1	-17.2
Mid Glamorgan	11	1.2	1.0	+25.1
West Glamorgan	5	0.6	0.8	-29.5
Inner London	90	10.1	7.1	+41.9
North East London	6	0.7	2.0	-66.1
South East London	3	0.3	1.2	-72.2
South West London	3	0.3	1.0	-65.3
Middlesex	41	4.6	3.8	+22.2

Glossary of abbreviations

ACPO	Assistant chief probation officer
CPO	Chief probation officer
CRAMS	Case Record Administration and Management System
CS	Community service
DCPO	Deputy chief probation officer
HMIPHM	Inspectorate of Probation
IT	Information technology
MPSO	Money Payment Supervision Order
SPO	Senior probation officer
VAC	Voluntary Aftercare