



*PROTECTING CHILDREN
FROM
POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS PEOPLE*

*An Inter-Agency Inspection on
Children's Safeguards*

2002

FOREWORD

There is seldom a time that we are not reminded of the risks to children. November 2002, in the wake of the Soham murders and as we await the report of the inquiry into the death of Victoria Climbié, is regrettably no exception. Although murders involving children are thankfully statistically rare, children are more frequently at risk of abuse, sadly most usually from those close to them. All of which makes us acutely aware of the responsibilities of parents, practitioners in the care services and the community at large. Every new case leads us collectively to agonise about how we might better prevent a reoccurrence – though we are all conscious that even in the best regulated of worlds awful things will continue occasionally to happen and that trust in relationships is a precious commodity that we undermine at our peril. Inquiries are instituted, recommendations for new procedures made, fresh legislative provisions introduced. This is the backcloth against which this report is set. Several recent statutes – the Sex Offender Act 1997, the Protection of Children Act 1999 and the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 – have created new procedures, placed new duties on the police and probation services and given new responsibilities to certain classes of offenders. Further legislation is being prepared.

The reality, however, is that legislative safeguards count for nothing if their implementation is not backed up by resources, which includes personnel, training, and supporting systems. Vigilance can be fostered, but to thrive it needs prioritised space. This report considers how various provisions to safeguard children against persons known to pose a risk are working in practice. It is one of a series of reports on children's safeguards arising from a Social Services Inspectorate-led joint review, undertaken by all the Inspectorates of those services substantially involved with children. This particular report, prepared by Her Majesty's Inspectorates of Constabulary and Probation, focuses on the specific contribution of the police and probation services to assess and manage the risk of serious harm presented to children by potentially dangerous people.

The report contains much that is positive. We have found that in all the areas where data were collected the police and probation services are collaborating to an impressive degree scarcely imaginable as recently as a few years ago. But the report also finds that much remains to be done. Work has begun on developing a national strategy for public protection, but it is still not yet in place. As a result there is inconsistency in local arrangements, in large measure a product of the lack of agreed definitions and insufficient guidance about basic standards. There are not yet close enough links between Multi-Agency Public Protection Panels and Area Child Protection Committees. Moreover, better dissemination is needed of the lessons from research and experience. It is partly for these reasons that HM Inspectorates of Constabulary and Probation have jointly decided to return to this scene in the near future. We propose looking further at public protection issues in 2003.

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CONTENTS

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	5
------------------	---

GLOSSARY OF TERMS	6
-------------------	---

MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS	7
-----------------------------------	---

INTRODUCTION	9
--------------	---

FINDINGS	15
----------	----

Appendix 1	31
------------	----

Appendix 2	32
------------	----

Appendix 3	33
------------	----

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Particular thanks go to members of the Social Services Inspectorate who coordinated the inspection. In addition, thanks must go to colleagues in the other five Inspectorates involved in this inspection – the Commission for Health Improvement, HM Inspectorates of Magistrates' Courts, Crown Prosecution Service, Prisons and the Office for Standards in Education.

The inspection was reliant upon the cooperation of the areas inspected. The Inspectorates would like to express their gratitude to the managers and staff in the seven forces and probation areas visited who contributed to the inspection in such a positive way.

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GLOSSARY OF TERMS

Definitions

The definition of offenders who present a risk of serious harm to the public is complex and was problematic in this inspection because of the range of different definitions in use, both within and between areas. Those who may cause serious harm to children were the subject of this inspection but the focus on Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements also drew in those who may cause serious harm to adults.

'Risk of serious harm' is generally defined as a risk which is life threatening and or traumatic, and from which recovery, whether physical or psychological, can be expected to be difficult or impossible.

Potentially dangerous people are defined as offenders and also unconvicted people, who present a high risk of harm to the public, including children.

Assessment tools dealing with risk of serious harm use a number of different levels of risk. Low, medium and high risk of harm are common but more recent tools add a fourth level of 'very high'. Risk Matrix 2000(S)¹ and OASys² use four levels and their national implementation should lead to a common basic definition of risk of serious harm. The focus in this report is mainly upon those who presented a very high risk of causing serious harm to the public and specifically children.

Acronyms

ACPC	Area Child Protection Committee
ACPO	Association of Chief Police Officers
CJCS Act 2000	Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000
HMIC	HM Inspectorate of Constabulary
HMIP	HM Inspectorate of Probation
IT	Information technology
MAPPA	Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangement
MAPPP	Multi-Agency Public Protection Panel
NCIS	National Criminal Intelligence Service
NPS	National Probation Service
RAMP	Risk Assessment and Management Panel
SOO	Sex Offender Order
SSI	Social Services Inspectorate
ViSOR	Violent and Sex Offenders Register

¹ Risk Matrix 2000 is a suite of assessment tools for sexual and violent offenders. RM2000[S] covers sex offenders, RM2000[V] covers violent offenders and RM2000[C] covers offenders using a combination of sex and violence.

² OASys is the offender assessment tool developed by the prison and probation services. It is in use in some probation areas and is being rolled out nationally.

MAIN FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The inspection

The focus for the inspection was on the arrangements to safeguard children overseen by Area Child Protection Committees (ACPCs) and Multi-Agency Public Protection Panels (MAPPPs). Eight Inspectorates worked together to inspect in eight ACPC areas against an agreed set of standards and criteria. The full inspection aimed to evaluate the:

- implementation of *Working Together to Safeguard Children*³ and the Assessment Framework
- extent to which local ACPCs have fully and effectively addressed the full range of their duties and responsibilities
- initial working of arrangements for the protection of the public, and children in particular, from dangerous people.

This report focuses on the last of these and particularly the work of the police and probation services to develop and maintain Multi-Agency Public Protection Arrangements (MAPPAs) as set out in the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000 (CJCS Act 2000).

Main findings

- The level of cooperation and collaboration between the police and probation services at all levels and in every area visited was impressive.
- Overall there was inconsistency in MAPPAs for the assessment and management of very high risk of harm offenders and an absence of detailed national guidance.
- Although the legislation required the police and probation services to establish MAPPAs, it did not place a duty on other agencies to cooperate. This led to varying degrees of involvement.
- The resourcing of MAPPPs varied due to the absence of a nationally agreed funding formula.
- Relevant national standards, performance measures, targets for and arrangements to monitor and evaluate the effectiveness of MAPPPs were being developed but were not yet in place.
- All areas had an information sharing protocol, although some did not refer to more recent legislation.
- Information about original offences was not easily available to police officers prior to the release of prisoners.
- Risk management plans were not always considered from the perspective of potential victims.
- Formal links between ACPCs and MAPPPs had not been established in most areas.
- Both police and probation staff in most areas did not have access to relevant joint training opportunities.

³ Department of Health, Home Office and Department for Education and Employment *Working Together to Safeguard Children* A guide to inter-agency working to safeguard and promote the welfare of children (1999).

- In some areas visited offenders required to register with the police under the Sex Offender Act 1997 and assessed as lower-risk of harm were not subject to sufficient monitoring.
- The development of a national register for violent and sex offenders (ViSOR) was a positive initiative which had the potential to make a significant contribution to their management.
- Association of Chief Police Officer (ACPO) guidance on media and community disclosure was not being followed in a few areas.
- Most serious incident cases dealt with by probation staff were satisfactorily managed and little more could have been done to predict the eventual outcome.
- Lessons learnt from reviews of serious incidents, involving those under probation supervision, were not being disseminated nationally.

Recommendations

ACPO and the National Probation Service (NPS) should:⁴

- ensure that a national framework for MAPPA is implemented as a matter of priority in order to develop a more consistent approach to the assessment and management of very high risk of harm offenders. This should include:
 - a) structure, including membership of MAPPPs
 - b) information sharing
 - c) referral thresholds and assessment procedures for MAPPPs
 - d) risk management procedures and plans
 - e) appropriate resourcing
 - f) monitoring and reviewing effectiveness of MAPPPs
 - g) minimum training expectations
 - h) MAPPP links with ACPCs
- agree a set of national standards and performance measures for their joint management of offenders presenting a very high risk of serious harm to the public
- develop a national strategy for the identification and dissemination of lessons from research and experience in the assessment and management of very high-risk offenders
- ensure that documentation relating to original index offences is available to appropriate agencies during sentence and upon release.

⁴ See Appendix 2 for recommendations to the Home Office from *Safeguarding Children A* joint Chief Inspectors' Report which should be cross-referenced with these.

INTRODUCTION

Purpose of the report

1. This report has been prepared jointly by HM Inspectorates of Constabulary and Probation drawing on the findings of an *Inter-Agency Inspection on Children's Safeguards*. The full inspection and national report covered a wide range of activities undertaken by agencies in order to safeguard children. That report contains recommendations for the Home Office (see Appendix 2) that should be cross-referenced with those in this report. The focus of this report is on the specific contribution made by the police and probation services through their work to assess and manage the risk of serious harm presented to children by potentially dangerous people. It enables a more detailed analysis of the extensive amounts of information generated that could not be included in the national report on the full inspection.

Background to the Children's Safeguards Inspection

2. The Social Services White Paper *Modernising Social Services*, published in 1998, proposed that all Chief Inspectors of services substantially involved with children should publish a single joint report on children's safeguards. This was to enable the Government to satisfy itself that the safeguards for children were being properly implemented, and that their safety continued to be given the priority it deserved. The Chief Inspectors of Social Services Inspectorate (SSI), the Office for Standards in Education (OFSTED), the Commission for Health Improvement and the Inspectorates for Prisons, Probation, Police, Magistrates' Courts Service and the Crown Prosecution Service made a joint commitment to take this work forward by reporting every three years commencing in 2002.
3. The full inspection evaluated local arrangements for safeguarding children and young people within and between all local agencies working with children and their families. This included evaluation of:
 - implementation of *Working Together to Safeguard Children* and the Assessment Framework
 - extent to which local ACPCs have fully and effectively addressed the full range of their duties and responsibilities
 - initial working of arrangements for the protection of the public, and children in particular, from dangerous people.
4. It focused on the implementation of:
 - **Sex Offender Act 1997**

This Act placed a duty on police services to establish and maintain a Sex Offender Register, and was implemented from 1 September 1997. It imposed a requirement on certain sex offenders to notify the police of their name(s) and address(es) and any changes to these details in order to ensure that the information contained within the police national computer was kept fully up to date. Further legislative provisions to manage sex offenders in the community included the Crime [Sentences] Act 1997 and

the use of Sex Offender Orders (SOOs) under the Crime and Disorder Act 1998. Chief Officers of Police were issued with Home Office Circular 39/1997 – *Sex Offenders Act 1997* and 20/2001 – *Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000: Amendments to the Sex Offenders Act 1997*.

- **Working Together to Safeguard Children**

Published jointly in 1999 by the Department of Health, Home Office and the Department for Education and Employment, these guidelines set out how all agencies and professionals should work together to promote children’s welfare and protect them from abuse and neglect. It dealt with processes and procedures to be adopted by all agencies and specifically the joint working arrangements for ACPCs. It set out a new national Assessment Framework – a systematic basis for collecting and analysing information about children in need and their families.

- **Protection of Children Act 1999**

The legislation was aimed at protecting children from adults likely to cause them harm. Terms were set out for the Criminal Records Bureau to provide information from the lists of those who come to notice as being unsuitable to work with children.

- **Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000**

From 1 April 2001 duties were placed on the police and probation services to make arrangements for the assessment and management of the risks posed by sexual, violent and other offenders who may cause serious harm to the public. The Act named the chief officer of police and the local probation board as the ‘responsible authorities’ and gave the Secretary of State the power to issue guidance to responsible authorities on the discharge of these functions. Initial guidance was issued in March 2001 setting out the minimum requirements under the Act.⁵ The operation of MAPPPs was covered in the guidance. The legislation did not cover the involvement of other agencies in MAPPA.

5. The police and probation services operate within the Government’s Correctional Policy Framework and, in the context of protecting the public, work to contribute to the achievement of the following aims:

Home Office Aim 3: To ensure the effective delivery of justice

Home Office Aim 4: To deliver effective custodial and community sentences to reduce reoffending and protect the public.

The protection of life and property is a fundamental aim and purpose of the police service, by ensuring the registration, risk assessment and case management of sex offenders and potentially dangerous people and by addressing the issue of disclosure. It is the intention of the police to reduce the risk to the public posed by such individuals.

A critical aim of the NPS is ‘Protecting the Public’. To achieve this its key tasks include:

- the assessment of offenders
- the provision of reports on individual offenders to courts and other appropriate stakeholders
- the supervision of offenders on community sentences and prisoners released from prison on a statutory licence

⁵ Home Office *Initial Guidance to the Police and Probation Services on Sections 67 & 68 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000* (March 2001).

- the provision of a range of programmes for offenders based on methods that are known to reduce reconviction
- the collaboration with other agencies involved in managing high risk of harm offenders in the community
- the work in prisons and hostels
- contact with victims of serious sexual and violent offences.

In the last ten years there has been considerable growth in multi-agency working with the development of joint approaches to risk assessment and management. In local areas stronger links have been established between police and probation managers at strategic and operational levels. With the CJCS Act 2000 and national guidance on the minimum requirements for MAPPA, there has been a movement nationally towards a more consistent approach.

Until April 2001 the probation service was made up of 54 independent local services. The CJCS Act 2000 created the NPS with a National Director and 42 probation areas co-terminous with police force areas. These boundary changes make cooperation between many police and probation services increasingly straightforward and should enable more effective collaboration.

Methodology

6. The full inspection was based on eight specifically developed standards and criteria. The first seven standards focused on the work of ACPCs and their constituent agencies. Standard 8 (see Appendix 1) focused on MAPPA, the operation of Sex Offender Registers and related police and probation services' activities. The full inspection report gives an overview of the findings from all eight standards. This report gives a more detailed description of the findings from Standard 8.
7. The Standard states:
 - The police and probation services, in collaboration with other relevant agencies, ensure that effective arrangements to assess and manage the risks posed to children by potentially dangerous people are being established, monitored and reviewed.
8. Themes covered in the criteria included the:
 - establishment by the police and probation services of effective systems to meet the requirements of Sections 67 and 68 of the CJCS Act 2000. This criterion covers the operation of MAPPPs
 - development by the police of a Sex Offender Register, which is monitored and reviewed, and its effectiveness evaluated in accordance with the Sex Offender Act 1997, subsequently amended by Schedule 5 of the CJCS Act 2000.
 - use made by the probation service and other relevant agencies of legislation and other facilities to place external controls on offenders posing a high risk of harm to children.
 - training of the police and probation services' staff in identifying, assessing and managing the risk to children posed by potentially dangerous people

- extent to which the probation service had acted upon the recommendations of HM Inspectorate of Probation's (HMIP's) Review of Serious Incidents⁶
 - arrangements put in place by the police and other relevant agencies to reduce the risks posed by unconvicted people identified as posing a danger to children
 - procedures established by the police and probation services to promote equality and eliminate unlawful discrimination in respect of potentially dangerous people.
9. The methodology for the full inspection was developed by the eight Inspectorates working collaboratively, with the SSI leading on the modules covering the work of ACPCs and their constituent agencies and HMIP working with HM Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) to develop the module in respect of potentially dangerous people.
10. Fieldwork was undertaken in eight local authority areas:
- the London borough of Hammersmith and Fulham (covered by the Metropolitan Police and the London Probation Area)
 - the London borough of Harrow (covered by the Metropolitan Police and the London Probation Area)
 - Nottingham City (covered by Nottinghamshire Police and Nottinghamshire Probation Area)
 - Kent (covered the Kent County Constabulary and the Kent Probation Area)
 - Surrey (covered by Surrey Police and the Surrey Probation Area)
 - North Yorkshire (covered by the North Yorkshire Police and the North Yorkshire Probation Area)
 - Shropshire (covered by West Mercia Constabulary and West Mercia Probation Area)
 - Stockport (covered by Greater Manchester Police and Greater Manchester Probation Area).
11. The inspection involved initial and fieldwork phases, the collation of the evidence and feedback to the agencies:
- **initial pre-inspection activity** included scrutiny of relevant data and documentation, a questionnaire to probation areas, file reading and an inter-Inspectorate meeting to share initial findings
 - **fieldwork** was undertaken in a modular way so that each of the Inspectorates joined the inspection fieldwork for specified days. The potentially dangerous people module was led jointly by HM Inspectorates of Constabulary and Probation with assistance from SSI inspectors. Police fieldwork for this module was led by HMIC with support from HMIP and the probation visits were led by HMIP with support from SSI.
12. HMIP's methodology included:
- **scrutiny of probation policy and other relevant documents** – statements covering the promotion of the safety of children, effectiveness of inter-agency working to safeguard children and communication with local communities and relevant documents

⁶ HM Inspectorate of Probation An Occasional Paper *Serious Incidents: Probation services' compliance with the notification requirements of Probation Circular 71/1998*. This required probation services (now areas) to notify the Probation Unit (now the National Probation Directorate) when an offender under their supervision was charged with committing a serious sexual or violent offence. Following notification in many cases a review of the management of the case was also required (2000).

- **national survey of policy and practice** – covering child protection and public protection issues was sent to 42 probation areas. Forty questionnaires were returned
 - **file reading** – a sample of 42 probation cases of offenders referred to MAPPPs was scrutinised
 - **a wide range of interviews** – with the Director of the NPS, members of the Home Office Dangerous Offenders Unit. In each area interviews with the Chief Officer and Board Chair, senior manager(s) with strategic responsibility for public protection, human resource management and training, local team or district managers and practitioners
 - **observation of MAPPP meetings** – in areas where a meeting coincided with the fieldwork
 - **audit of serious incident notifications** – inspectors scrutinised serious incident notifications and reports for 2001/2002 and analysed those involving children.
13. HMIC's methodology included:
- **scrutiny of police policy and other relevant documents** – relating to the risk assessment and management of sexual and potentially dangerous offenders
 - **file reading** – of registered sex offender files
 - **a wide range of interviews** – with ACPO level staff with strategic responsibility for public protection, senior managers with force-wide responsibility, local team managers and officers with responsibility for visiting/monitoring sex offenders
 - **observation of uniform officers' shift briefings** – including interviews with uniform patrol officers
 - **observation at MAPPP meetings** – in areas where a meeting coincided with fieldwork.
14. The collation phase involved extensive discussion amongst the eight Inspectorates pulling out the common themes and emerging findings against each of the criterion.
15. Following each area inspection an internal report on the findings was fed back to both the police and probation services.

Relevant research

16. The most recent relevant research on multi-agency working was – Police Research Series Paper 139, by Maguire et al.⁷ The main aims of the study were to examine the range of practice between areas; to evaluate working practice between agencies and multi-agency cooperation; to illustrate good practice; and recommend improvements.
17. Key findings of the study can be summarised as follows:
- there was a wide range of different risk assessment and risk management systems and organisational arrangements
 - the majority of cases dealt with by panels were sex offenders
 - rising workloads were resulting in strained resources and dilemmas over prioritisation
 - the management of sexual and violent offenders in lower-risk categories tended to be given less priority by the police service

⁷ Maguire, M, Kemshall, H, Noaks, L, Wincup, E and Sharpe, K *Risk Management of Sexual and Violent Offenders: The Work of Public Protection Panels* Police Research Series Paper 139 (April 2001).

- the police and probation services were fully committed to partnership, and the working relationships between them were broadly close and harmonious. The commitment and cooperation of other agencies, by contrast, was marginal in some areas
 - cultural and ideological differences between agencies caused tensions, but these were generally overcome where more 'corporate' and less 'one-sided' multi-agency arrangements were in place
 - risk management practice was generally sound and well organised in relation to high-risk offenders, but more variable in relation to those considered medium or low risk
 - disclosure of information about registered sex offenders and those on SOOs was regarded as an option of last resort
 - systems of senior managerial oversight, case review, feedback, monitoring and accountability ranged from the comprehensive to the minimal.
18. The authors of the paper proposed that the most efficient and appropriate use of senior staff time was a two-tier system as follows:
- a high level MAPP (or in large police force areas, perhaps several panels) which dealt with only very high-risk cases.
 - a network of lower tier Risk Assessment and Management Panels (RAMPs).
19. The research, which was published before the CJCS Act 2000, covered similar ground to this inspection and so it is interesting to compare the two sets of findings, e.g. the diversity of arrangements, resource issues, and the positive collaboration between the police and probation services.
20. Some recent research findings published by the Home Office⁸ on the police perspective on SOOs included:
- patterns of SOO applications were not uniformly distributed with a minority of forces actively pursuing orders
 - success was based on – a central point of contact for the coordination of orders across the force; an emphasis on sex offenders within overall force policy; the enthusiasm of individual officers and the force solicitors; the accumulated experience of getting a series of successful orders through court
 - the standard of proof required needed to be clarified
 - obtaining a SOO at court was relatively straightforward
 - monitoring of SOOs was often the responsibility of the police alone but in some cases a multi-agency approach was taken
 - there was a wide variation in the sentencing for breach of SOOs from lengthy prison sentences to small fines
 - overall there was a positive view of the SOO which was particularly valued as an active response to higher-risk sex offenders in the community.

The findings from this inspection were consistent with and support the recent research findings.

⁸ Home Office Police Research Series Paper 155: *The Police Perspective on Sex Offender Orders: A preliminary review of police policy and practice* (June 2002).

FINDINGS

STANDARD 8: REDUCING THE RISK OF SIGNIFICANT HARM TO CHILDREN FROM POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS PEOPLE

The police and probation services, in collaboration with other relevant agencies, ensure that effective arrangements to assess and manage the risks posed to children by potentially dangerous people are being established, monitored and reviewed.

Criterion: 8.1

The police and probation services have established effective systems to meet the requirements of Sections 67 and 68 of the Criminal Justice and Court Services Act 2000.

Background information

21. Initial guidance on the implementation of the CJCS Act 2000 was issued in March 2001 setting out the minimum requirements for MAPPPs. These included establishing:
- strategic management arrangements for reviewing and monitoring the effectiveness of arrangements made and for revising them as necessary or expedient
 - agreed systems and processes for sharing information and for inter-agency working on all relevant offenders
 - agreed systems and processes to ensure that only those critical few that require additional consideration are referred to a MAPPP
 - agreed systems and processes for a MAPPP for the highest-risk cases, including young offenders
 - arrangements for resource allocation and multi-agency training
 - community and media communications
 - an agreed annual report and statistics.

Further guidance was being developed through a process of consultation with a multi-agency user group and a second round of regional seminars was due to take place in Autumn 2002.

22. The Dangerous Offender Unit, which is part of the Home Office and staffed by both police and probation representatives, organised a series of regional seminars in 2001 to consider the next steps in relation to MAPPPs. These included consideration of such issues as standards, monitoring, lay involvement and offender attendance at MAPPPs. Further guidance was issued on the format and contents of the MAPPP annual reports, which were due for their first publication in July 2002. Ongoing work included:
- pilot lay involvement projects
 - defining performance indicators

- establishing threshold criteria and the management of lower-risk offenders
- establishing standards for practice.

National strategic arrangements

23. ACPO had recognised the link between child protection and potentially dangerous sex offenders and, as such, they fall within the same ACPO Crime Business Area led by one Chief Officer. That lead officer also represented ACPO on the MAPPA Further Guidance Strategy Group, which had sat several times during the first year of the operation of MAPPA. Information and guidance from that group was disseminated to all ACPO colleagues through their Intranet.
24. The Strategic Framework 2001/2004 for the NPS *A New Choreography* placed the accurate and effective assessment and management of risk and dangerousness as a top priority, although there were no plans to set specific relevant targets until 2004. Building on the establishment of MAPPA, the review of existing arrangements and extending the use of external controls were all part of the NPS development plan. Children's safeguards did not receive a specific mention but they would form part of the overall brief to protect the public.
25. Work to develop a national framework for MAPPA had been led by the Home Office Dangerous Offenders Unit. Ongoing work included pilot lay involvement projects, defining performance indicators, establishing threshold criteria, arrangements for the management of lower-risk offenders and standards for practice.

Local strategic arrangements

26. All areas inspected had arrangements in place to meet the requirements of the CJCS Act (2000). There was a high level of cooperation between the police and probation services and a strong commitment to ensuring that arrangements were effective.
27. In nearly all areas there was a strategic forum for agreeing and overseeing the operation of MAPPA. In most forces this was attended by an Assistant Chief Constable and from probation by an Assistant Chief Officer. Managers from other agencies, e.g. social services, health, housing, also attended the forum. In the context of safeguarding children there was an opportunity for formal links to be made between ACPCs and MAPPPs. In the national survey of probation areas, only 18 reported that they had done so.
28. Most areas had issued to staff the initial guidance on Sections 67 and 68 of the CJCS Act 2000. This had not been supported by training or briefing events and so awareness among front line staff of the detail of the guidance was weak in some areas.
29. Table 1 shows the results of a national survey of probation areas (40 out of 42 areas responded).

Table 1 Implementation of initial guidance on MAPPPs

Source: HMIP survey questionnaire

<i>Minimum requirements and other issues</i>	<i>Number of areas</i>
Established strategic arrangements for monitoring, reviewing and evaluating MAPPPs	30 out of 40 areas, with 22 having revised arrangements to fit with the new guidance
Established and agreed systems and processes for sharing information and for inter-agency working	38 out of 40 areas, with 22 having revised them to meet the new guidance
Established and agreed systems and processes for referring cases to MAPPPs	37 out of 40 areas, with 26 having revised them to meet the new guidance
Established and agreed procedures for convening, operating and recording the decisions of MAPPPs	37 out of 40 areas, with 26 having revised them to meet the new guidance
Issued new guidance to staff	28 out of 40 areas
Training on the operation of MAPPPs	In 5 areas all relevant staff had received specific training In 8 some relevant staff had received specific training In 11 areas all relevant staff had received training on arrangements in existence prior to the new guidance In 3 areas staff had not been trained in the operation of MAPPPs or any existing arrangements 13 of 31 areas who had trained staff had done so jointly with the police
Established and agreed a strategy for external communication	24 out of 40 areas

Commentary

- The publication of initial guidance had triggered a review of arrangements in most areas.
- The guidance had not been widely disseminated to staff in many areas.
- Training on the operation of MAPPPs for relevant staff was patchy.
- Although some areas delivered training jointly with the police, there was room for development of inter-agency training in many areas.

Information sharing and disclosure

30. In all areas inspected there was an information-sharing protocol between police and probation and in most areas other agencies were also signatories, e.g. social services, youth offending teams, health, housing. The combination varied from area to area and was linked to membership of and commitment to the MAPPP. Protocols included agreements about community and media disclosure. These varied with some areas requiring the MAPPP to sanction disclosure and others requiring a senior police officer to make the final decision. ACPO guidance circulated nationally in December 2000 indicated that, following consultation, final decisions should be made by a senior police officer, normally an Assistant Chief Constable. Many areas were in the process of

updating their protocols to ensure that they met the requirements of the Human Rights Act 1998 and other recent relevant legislation.

31. The presumption in most areas was in favour of sharing all relevant information. In order to ensure that this was both proportionate and relevant to the prevention of crime, both the police and probation services needed to have a better grasp of the relevant legislation. In one area (Harrow) a summary of the legislation was attached to a referral form for MAPPPs.
32. The use of information technology (IT) solutions for information sharing was rare. One area (Lancashire) not inspected had developed a joint police and probation database for sharing information about high risk of harm offenders. This project had been taken on nationally and a database, ViSOR (Violent and Sex Offender Register), was soon to be piloted.
33. There were a few problems identified by areas with either a reluctance to share information or with information from the MAPPP arena being shared without agreement. These arose with other agencies rather than between police and probation.
34. In many areas there was confusion about terminology both within and between agencies. For example, when referring to 'dangerous offenders' some people included sex offenders in the definition and others saw them as a separate category.

The operation of MAPPPs

Structure

35. Second-tier MAPPPs (some called RAMPs or Multi-Agency Risk Panels), or first-tier where they were combined with a strategic forum, were convened either on a routine basis, e.g. once a month or for specific cases as the need arose. Multi-case MAPPPs would consider several offenders on the same agenda. They allowed more time for the higher-risk cases and reviewed some of the lower-risk cases briefly. All members would stay for the whole agenda except where practitioners had been invited to introduce a specific case. A minute would be produced on each case.
36. The single case MAPPPs tended to spend longer on each case and members of the meeting attended because they had a specific interest in the case. In some areas supervising probation officers did not attend the MAPPP. In those meetings that were observed they had a significant contribution to make to assessment and planning and discussions were poorer for their absence. See Appendix 3 for a summary of the MAPPP found during this inspection. Other than police and probation there was a range of other organisations taking part in MAPPPs. They varied between areas, some involving representatives from statutory and voluntary organisations in the health, housing, employment, social care and criminal justice sectors. The existing legislation did not place on them a duty to cooperate with MAPPP and therefore left MAPPPs in particular open to varying degrees of involvement.

Referral and levels of risk

37. In the areas inspected thresholds for referral varied considerably, with a number of MAPPPs considering a broad range of cases and others focusing on the critical few. For instance, in one MAPPP which was observed, there was an agenda with about 20

offenders for consideration. Some of these were considered relatively low risk of causing serious harm to the public and were discussed briefly for information rather than action. Another area inspected had only considered a handful of very high risk of serious harm offenders at their MAPPP during the whole year. In a number of areas they were also used as a forum for the management of offenders on the Sex Offender Register. These MAPPPs tended to consider a broader range of cases. The national survey of probation areas found that the proportion of the caseload on a public protection register ranged from zero to 25%. The proportion of these subject to MAPPPs ranged from 1% to 100%. Many areas were unable to provide data because referrals were not monitored.

38. Few of the areas inspected used a formal referral process, with most accepting a written note to the first meeting to consider the offender. This led to inconsistency in the level of information on each offender before the MAPPP. For instance, in one area where the supervising officer was present and had also provided a written note, there was a detailed consideration of the risk assessment and effectiveness of the risk management plan. Some areas were in the process of considering the introduction of a formal referral process. The probation file reading exercise found that a quarter of probation referrals could have been timelier. In a number of licence cases there were comments from file readers that referrals could have been made to MAPPPs well before release.

Organisation of meetings

39. In some areas police officers chaired the MAPPP and in others it was probation. In one area there was a dedicated, jointly funded MAPPP coordinator. A few areas were discussing the establishment of joint public protection units to develop a more consistent approach to the management of sex/dangerous offenders. None of the people chairing MAPPPs had had any training specific to the role.
40. Administrative arrangements varied, with a number of areas having a dedicated administrator provided by either police or probation, whilst in others there was a joint appointment. Some managers raised concerns about the lack of a firm statutory footing for MAPPPs and the impact this had on consistent resourcing and commitment from all agencies.
41. Minutes of meetings needed improvement. Generally they lacked detail, did not contain a sufficient risk management plan and did not record how decisions had been reached. None of the minutes seen during the fieldwork contained an adequate assessment of risk factors, protective factors and triggers. In one area they had started to audiotape meetings so that, should the need arise, the detail of discussions could be revisited. The probation file reading exercise found that a fifth of probation files did not contain a copy of the MAPPP minute. Table 2 shows that, where there was a minute on file, the following were sufficiently identified:

Table 2 Quality of the minutes of MAPPP meetings

Source: HMIP file reading of MAPPPs cases

Criteria	Percentage
• Main risk factors	79 (27 out of 34 cases)
• Decisions made	83 (29 out of 35 cases)
• Action agreed	86 (30 out of 35 cases)
• Agencies responsible for action agreed	80 (28 out of 35 cases)
• Timescale for action	46 (16 out of 35 cases)
• Date of the next review	80 (28 out of 35 cases)

Commentary

- In cases involving very high-risk offenders the expectation was that areas would be achieving close to 100% against all criteria. So where performance dips below this by even a few percentage points there would be room for improvement.
 - In about one in five cases the MAPPP minute did not contain a sufficient record of the main risk factors, the agencies responsible for the action agreed or the date of the next review.
 - There was a better record of decisions made and action agreed.
 - The timescale for action was the least well recorded, with less than half of the cases meeting this criterion.
 - In 37% of cases all the above items were sufficiently identified.
42. The file reading also showed that in 29 of relevant cases (85%) the action plan aimed at reducing risk to children was appropriate in the circumstances of the case.
43. The following were comments made by those reading probation files:
- “MAPPP meetings were not well recorded and needed to be better integrated into area mechanisms”
 - “An area for improvement is the inclusion of MAPPP minutes and action plans on probation files”.
44. Managers from the areas inspected agreed that there was room for improvement in the minuting of meetings and recording of risk assessment and risk management plans.

Assessment of offenders

45. Assessment processes varied between MAPPPs. All police forces used RM2000 to assess sex offenders but most MAPPPs supplemented this by using locally gathered intelligence. Probation assessment tools varied with most areas using a pro forma to assess risk of harm to the public, self and staff. The probation file reading exercise showed that there was some room for improvement in the quality of assessments and particularly in the extent to which they addressed risk to children.
46. Agency-based assessments were fed into the MAPPP discussions and decisions made on the basis of all available information. The level of risk and risk management plans were the main outputs from MAPPP meetings. A new assessment tool – OASys – was about to be introduced. It had been developed jointly by the prison and probation services and would replace existing assessment and supervision planning

tools. Both probation and police staff expressed positive views about the potential of OASys to improve assessment and management processes.

47. Table 3 shows the findings on the quality of probation assessment.

Table 3 Quality of probation assessment of specific issues in MAPPP cases involving children

Source: HMIP file reading of MAPPPs cases

<i>Issue</i>	<i>Percentage dealt with appropriately</i>
Child Protection	76 (29 out of 38 cases)
Sexual Offences	76 (26 out of 34 cases)
Domestic Violence	71 (10 out of 14 cases)
Racially Motivated Offending	0 (0 out of 4 cases)
Mental Health	78 (14 out of 18 cases)
Race Equality	50 (3 out of 6 cases)
Gender	71 (12 out of 17 cases)
Drugs and Alcohol	71 (17 out of 24 cases)
Risk to Staff	50 (13 out of 26 cases)
Risk to Self	48 (13 out of 27 cases)

Commentary

- No area of practice stood out as good. Although practice was better in relation to child protection, sexual offences and mental health there was still room for improvement. Areas should expect to hit as close to 100% as possible in the management of these cases.
 - Although small in number it was of particular concern that racially motivated offending and race equality were not well handled. Other aspects of the inspection also showed that in the context of public protection practitioners found it difficult to keep diversity issues on the agenda.
48. The file reading also showed that in only 41% of cases (17 out of 41) were all relevant issues dealt with appropriately which was a matter of concern.
49. An analysis of the comments made by probation file readers looked at the details of why the initial or full assessment of risk of harm to children was inadequate. These included missing or inadequate information, too much focus on other aspects of the case and hence neglecting child protection issues and a failure to reassess offenders at regular intervals.
50. Assessments tended to focus on the offender rather than potential victims and some cases would have benefited from this different perspective, e.g. when placing an offender in new accommodation a risk assessment of the environment with a focus on potential victims should be carried out.
51. Police and probation did not carry out routine checks on the accuracy of assessments.

Resourcing of MAPPPs

52. Although the number of offenders dealt with by MAPPPs was relatively small compared to the total workload of the police and probation services, they demanded a higher proportion of resources than most cases because of the potential harm those offenders could cause and the need to ensure that all appropriate steps were taken to reduce the risks. This also made it critical that through a robust assessment process areas were able to identify the critical few cases which could attract this higher level of resourcing.
53. There was a wide variation in criteria for referral to and therefore the number of cases dealt with by MAPPPs. This led to considerable difference in the level and allocation of resources and in no area was there a joint planned approach to workload management. Levels of management, practitioner and administration time available for MAPPPs were different in each area and there was a lack of an agreed formula for resourcing.

Review of cases and the effectiveness of MAPPPs

54. In all areas there was a mechanism to review cases, normally by setting a review date at the MAPPP. However in most areas there were no arrangements in place for reviewing the effectiveness of the MAPPP itself. The monitoring requirements set out in the recent guidance for annual reports asked for monitoring returns, including the number of sex offenders on the local register, the number of SOOs applied for and gained and the number of offenders considered under the arrangements prescribed by the CJCS Act 2000. The monitoring focused on volume rather than quality issues. In some areas police and probation managers carried out a joint audit of high-risk cases. These focused on the management of the case rather than on the effectiveness of the MAPPP itself.
55. Table 4 sets out some findings from the probation file reading exercise:

Table 4 Case management and review

Source: HMIP file reading of MAPPPs cases

<i>Issue</i>	<i>Percentage of relevant cases</i>
Probation action plan implementation	67 (24 out of 36 cases) very effective or satisfactory
Action plan reviewed	74 (26 out of 35 cases – the record was not clear in 9 cases)
Subsequent action plans likely to reduce the harm to children	86 (24 out of 28 cases)
Additional conditions implemented	78 (18 out of 23 cases) very effectively or satisfactorily
Enforcement action taken	90 (9 out of 10 cases, although in 2 of these it was outside the national standard time limit)
Line management oversight	81 (34 out of 42 cases) excellent or good enough
Senior management oversight	52 (22 out of 42 cases) excellent or good enough – in 11 cases the record was unclear
Overall management of the case and actions taken to reduce the risk of harm to children	78 (32 out of 41 cases) done very well or adequately

Commentary

- It was disappointing that only 67% of probation action plans were satisfactorily implemented and that only 74% were reviewed. However, where they were produced, subsequent action plans were thought likely to reduce the likelihood of harm to children in most cases.
 - There was some room for improvement in the implementation of additional licence conditions.
 - Only 11 of the 42 cases read required enforcement action and in nine of those action had been taken albeit in two cases this was outside the time limit of ten working days. There was some room for improvement, although this result was encouraging.
 - Oversight by first line managers was much better than by senior managers. It was not clear whether the problem lay with the lack of oversight itself or whether there were inadequate systems for recording actions taken by senior managers.
56. The file reading also showed that in the two cases where further harm to a child had occurred, in one case the probation service had taken every reasonable step to prevent this happening and in the other it had not.
57. Comments by file readers included:
- “Risk management meeting does not appear to have included issues relating to safeguarding children and should have included social services in the discussion and decision-making.”
 - “Very good inter-agency liaison. Good overview of case by line/senior management, very good management of case – boundaries, verification work to reduce risk ...”
 - “Probation officer identified fantasies and the level of risk posed by the offender and took appropriate action to involve others in the risk management plan.”
 - “No process in place to link MAPPP process with supervision.”
58. Overall, although there had been significant efforts made to improve the arrangements for assessing and managing the critical few offenders who presented a very high risk of serious harm to the public, there needed to be continued and sustained development and improvement of practice and procedures.

Criterion: 8.2

The police have established a Sex Offender Register, which is monitored and reviewed, and the effectiveness of the register is evaluated.

59. The inspection found that in all areas visited police officers were using RM2000 to assess the static risks posed by sex offenders but, as far as dynamic risks were concerned, the response varied. There were three versions – one designed for sex offenders (RM2000[S]), one for violent sex offenders (RM2000[C]) and one for violent offenders (RM2000[V]) – with a lack of clarity about which versions were in use.
60. It was evident that not all forces visited were using all the available information to assess risk of harm. For example, when a person was convicted and sentenced, the Crown Prosecution Service prepared a package of documents for the probation service. This pack contained information from the prosecution file (i.e. summary of evidence, relevant witness statements and copy of record of tape-recorded interview), which would accompany an offender throughout the sentence or community order. If a person had been convicted a number of years ago, or moved from the force where the

original offence was committed, it was sometimes problematic to get hold of the information and so completing an accurate dynamic risk assessment was difficult. This information was not always considered by police officers.

61. The actual management of offenders also varied from area to area visited. Some forces had prescriptive visiting timetables depending on the risk of harm posed by the offender. In other areas, the MAPPP determined how often an offender would be visited. Very high and high risk of harm offenders were given priority but in a number of areas there was little or no supervision being done by the police with medium and low risk of harm offenders, which caused some concerns.
62. Surveillance was being conducted by most forces to gather evidence in relation to the 'lifestyle' of the individual or if it was suspected that there was possible criminal activity. However, all interviewees stated that due to the cost of running surveillance operations, it usually meant that it could not be sustained over long periods of time. It was noted that other agencies, such as the probation service and housing departments, were willing to assist with gathering information when appropriate.
63. Inspectors found that there were inconsistencies in relation to the clerical support offered to the officers who were supervising these individuals. All said that the administration burden was heavy which meant that this detracted them from their supervisory role.
64. Concern was shown by officers that no national database had yet been established to register sex offenders. Nearly all forces stated that they had been waiting for the database to be developed and, as a result, had not established their own. However, one Constabulary (Kent) had utilised HOLMES II (a database for dealing with complex major investigations) as a centralised database to track all registered sex offenders and dangerous people.

Criterion: 8.3

The probation service and other relevant agencies make full use of legislation and other facilities to place external controls on offenders posing a risk to children.

65. External controls are the range of measures available to the police and probation services designed to manage offenders effectively in the community. They include court orders and prison licences but also a wide range of other options such as surveillance and the use of intelligence sources. They can either require an offender to refrain from certain activities, e.g. contacting or going near the victim(s) of their offence(s), or they can require the offender to undertake a specific activity, e.g. attend a sex offender programme or reside in a probation hostel.
66. There was good use of additional requirements and licence conditions evidenced in case records. Through the MAPPP process all relevant agencies were able to influence risk management plans and the use of external controls. Other agencies were also prepared to contribute to monitoring the effectiveness of external controls e.g. housing managers were able to provide information on the movements of high-risk offenders.
67. The findings in relation to external controls involving children are set out in table 5.

Table 5 External controls

Source: HMIP file reading of MAPPPs cases

- 14 out of 42 cases had a condition to attend a treatment programme, 10 of these were specifically for sex offenders
- 11 out of 42 cases specified that victims were not to be contacted or approached
- 2 cases had exclusion conditions from victims' neighbourhoods
- 5 offenders were not allowed any contact with children
- 7 offenders were prevented from working or living with children
- 8 offenders were required to live at a specific address

Commentary

- A significant proportion of cases had a condition to attend a treatment programme, typically for sex offenders this would involve attendance for 230 hours or more of group work sessions.
 - Conditions prohibiting contact with victims or from victims' neighbourhoods were quite common.
 - Some offenders had conditions preventing them from contacting, or applying for jobs involving contact with, children. These conditions would be used with offenders who had targeted children in the past.
 - Eight offenders were required to live at a specific address, often this would mean living in a probation hostel and abiding by the rules of the hostel, e.g. keeping to a curfew.
68. The file reading also found that some conditions used 16 years for age related conditions and some used under 18 years and that many offenders had more than one additional condition.
69. Conditions attached to licences and orders are designed to reduce the likelihood of an offender reoffending. They must also be reasonable and proportionate, balancing the protection of the public with the human and civil rights of the individual offender.
70. One Constabulary had made full use of the Memorandum of Understanding between the police and prison services by establishing a well-developed network of police prison liaison officers. They were able to maximise the use of intelligence gathered in relation to offenders being released from local prisons. They fed critical intelligence into the risk management planning process by preparing an intelligence package to share with other agencies and police forces.
71. The use of SOOs varied throughout the country. There was said to be some reluctance to apply for them because of the perceived difficulty in bringing a successful case and because there were significant resource considerations in monitoring an offender's compliance with the order.
72. More recently available options, e.g. Disqualification Orders and Restraining Orders, were used less often in the areas visited. Both of these options had to be made by the court at the point of sentence. The Disqualification Order made it an offence for an offender to apply for a job working with children. The Restraining Order could be

imposed, by the Crown Court, on any offender convicted of a sexual offence and sentenced to a period of imprisonment and might prohibit the offender from doing anything described in the order. Awareness of these more recent options was low.

Criterion: 8.4

The police and probation services ensure staff are trained in identifying, assessing and managing the risk to children posed by potentially dangerous people.

73. With the exception of officers who had attended the training course run by Lancashire Constabulary, forces visited had not provided any structured training for those engaged in the management of sex and dangerous offenders except for one-off training events such as RM2000. Often officers found themselves taking up their new posts without having had any training prior to commencement. Most found this unacceptable due to the seriousness of their work and thought that the issue of training needed to be addressed.
74. The inspection revealed that awareness about sex offenders amongst uniform patrol officers was extremely low and they did not understand their role in preventing reoffending.
75. In the national survey and in the fieldwork interviews most probation areas reported that there had been some training on public protection, risk assessment and management. However, there had been little focus on the MAPPPs themselves and levels of awareness amongst front line staff were sometimes low. The national implementation of OASys, as a combined assessment and planning tool, afforded areas the opportunity to update their training on both risk assessment and management and to join with police and prison colleagues in joint training.
76. Probation staff did not have sufficient understanding of the assessment tools being used in other agencies, e.g. the Assessment Framework used by social services or the different versions of RM2000.

Criterion: 8.5

The probation service has acted upon the recommendations of the HMIP Review of the Notification of Serious Incidents.

77. A series of Probation Circulars between 1995 and 1998⁹ set out a requirement for probation areas to identify, review and report on cases where an offender under probation supervision committed a very serious violent or sexual offence. In 2000 HMIP inspected areas to assess levels of reporting.¹⁰ A set of recommendations was aimed at addressing some of the variability in the system of identification and reporting. Areas inspected confirmed that these had been addressed, although this inspection did not look in depth at the effectiveness of their action. The national survey

⁹ Home Office Probation Circular 71/1998: *Serious Incident Reports: Analysis*; Probation Circular 41/1995: *Incident Reporting*.

¹⁰ Ibid, see footnote 6.

of probation areas found that 19 areas had addressed all recommendations, 14 had taken some action and two had not addressed them at all.

78. As part of this inspection HMIP carried out a national review of serious incident reviews for 2001/2002. The system of recording did not allow for cases involving children to be easily identified. A scrutiny of about 200 notifications revealed the following:
- 54 out of 200 notifications involved one or more victims of a new offence (many of these cases had not yet resulted in a conviction) being 17 years or below
 - 34 out of 54 cases involved sex offences
 - 26 were probation order/community punishment order cases, 15 were licences, eight were combination order/community punishment and rehabilitation order cases, three were community service supervision, one was at a bail hostel and one on a suspended sentence supervision order
 - 20 out of 42 areas notified cases. Of these, one area reported seven but most areas reported between one and three cases. The distribution of cases indicated that there may be underreporting in some areas
 - victims' ages ranged from a few months to 17 years. Two-thirds of cases, where gender of the victim was recorded, were female
 - 51 out of 54 offenders were male
 - in cases where the risk assessment was clearly indicated, about half had been assessed as high risk of serious harm and the rest were medium or low
 - management reviews did not always contain a comprehensive review of the offender assessment and so it was difficult to identify factors that may have predisposed the offender to sexual or violent offending. Thirty-two offenders had a previous conviction for sexual and/or violent offences, although this did not always indicate specific risk to children
 - most cases had been managed to national standards and in the majority of cases it would have been difficult for probation staff to have predicted the new offence. However, in a few cases probation staff could have taken steps which may have had an impact on the outcome
 - there were few links made between the principles and processes for Chapter 8 Reviews¹¹ and Serious Incident Reviews. This meant that they sometimes adopted different processes for a similar task.
79. Cases involving serious incidents represented a very small proportion of the total workload of the probation service – around 300 cases per year from a caseload that on any day is in excess of 200,000 offenders. Most serious incident cases dealt with by probation staff were satisfactorily managed and little more could have been done to predict the eventual outcome. However, with a developing understanding of the factors that reduce and increase the risk presented by individual offenders, the police and probation services have an increasingly complex task. More could have been learnt about the effective management of cases and the factors and triggers that lead to an offender committing a serious offence. The lessons to be learnt were not being analysed centrally and disseminated to all areas.
80. The review of serious incidents showed that there could be a more consistent approach to reviewing cases and that links could be made with the principles and processes for Chapter 8 Reviews. Probation service managers indicated that a formal review of the serious incident report process had already begun.

¹¹ Chapter 8 of *Working Together to Safeguard Children* sets out the requirements to review cases where a child dies and abuse or neglect are known or suspected to be a factor. They are also known as 'Part 8 Reviews'.

Criterion: 8.6

The police and other relevant agencies have arrangements in place to reduce the risks to children posed by unconvicted people who have been identified as posing a risk to children.

81. All forces visited reported that the management of unconvicted persons or offenders who fall outside of the CJCS Act 2000 was a difficult area. If risks were identified through intelligence, they were managed in the same manner as registered sex offenders, although officers complained that they had no legislative powers to assist them. In reality persons who are acquitted of sex crimes are unlikely to cooperate with the police or any other agency. The inspection found that no force had strategies in place regarding itinerant offenders or offenders who travel abroad.
82. As far as links with the National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) were concerned, most forces stated that they did not receive much information from them and were not really sure of their remit. One senior officer stated that he had written to them in October 2001 in relation to the management of offenders who travel and, despite many further enquiries, had still not received any guidance.
83. There was evidence during visits to areas that probation offered advice and support in the relevant cases not currently under their supervision but where they could contribute to the management plan. These arrangements were ad hoc and not normally written into protocols.

Criterion: 8.7

The police and probation services and other relevant agencies have ensured that arrangements in respect of potentially dangerous people promote equality and are non-discriminatory.

84. All the police and probation services visited had equal opportunities statements and staff were committed to ensuring that there was no discrimination built into the arrangements in respect of potentially dangerous people. However, no-one interviewed was able to describe how this was done in practice. It seemed that staff were able to consider public protection issues and equality and diversity issues but not to integrate one into the other. The probation file reading exercise for this inspection showed, albeit based on a small number of cases, that assessment of race equality and racially motivated offending issues needed improving.
85. The file reading contained a small number (four) of offenders from a minority ethnic background. It was therefore not possible to draw firm conclusions. However, it did show that overall two cases were managed well and in the other two it was unsatisfactory. In the four cases where racially motivated offending was identified as an issue, it was not dealt with well. It was also of concern that a quarter of cases did not have a race/ethnicity code.

86. The HMIP Thematic Inspection Report *Towards Race Equality*¹² had found that there were differences in the management of offenders from different ethnic groups. MAPPPs did not monitor equality and diversity issues and so it was impossible for them to be confident that there was no bias or discrimination in their work.

¹² HM Inspectorate of Probation *Towards Race Equality* Report of a Thematic Inspection (2000).

Appendix 1

STANDARD 8: REDUCING THE RISK OF SIGNIFICANT HARM TO CHILDREN FROM POTENTIALLY DANGEROUS PEOPLE

The police and probation services in collaboration with other relevant agencies ensure that effective arrangements to assess and manage the risks posed to children by potentially dangerous people are being established, monitored and reviewed.

Criteria:

- 8.1 The police and probation services have established effective systems to meet the requirements of Sections 67 and 68 of the CJCS Act 2000.
- 8.2 The police have established a Sex Offender Register, which is monitored and reviewed, and the effectiveness of the register is evaluated.
- 8.3 The probation service and other relevant agencies make full use of legislation and other facilities to place external controls on offenders posing a risk to children.
- 8.4 The police and probation services ensure staff are trained in identifying, assessing and managing the risk to children posed by potentially dangerous people.
- 8.5 The probation service has acted upon the recommendations of the HMIP Review of Serious Incidents.
- 8.6 The police and other relevant agencies have arrangements in place to reduce the risks to children posed by unconvicted people who have been identified as posing a risk to children.
- 8.7 The police and probation services and other relevant agencies have ensured that arrangements in respect of potentially dangerous people promote equality and are non-discriminatory.

Appendix 2

Safeguarding Children – A joint Chief Inspectors' Report on Arrangements to Safeguard Children, published in October 2002, contained the following recommendations to the Home Office which should be cross-referenced to the recommendations in this report to the ACPO and NPS.

They were:

- Ensure that safeguarding children and young people is a national priority for police services and the NPS as part of their public protection arrangements, and ensure that this priority is reflected in local service plans.
- Review the current arrangements for MAPPPs to identify whether they should be established on a statutory basis to ensure adequate accountability, authority, funding and consistency of practice.
- Ensure that the relationship between MAPPPs and ACPCs is clarified.
- Implement a national policy framework for public protection, including MAPPPs and wider children's safeguarding issues, as a matter of priority in order to develop a more consistent approach to the assessment and management of potentially dangerous people.
- Issue a set of national standards and performance measures for police and probation services' joint management of potentially dangerous offenders.

Appendix 3

MAPPP ARRANGEMENTS								
	<i>Hammersmith and Fulham</i>	<i>Harrow</i>	<i>Nottingham</i>	<i>Kent</i>	<i>Surrey</i>	<i>North Yorks</i>	<i>Shropshire</i>	<i>Stockport</i>
Strategic MAPPP overseeing policy and performance	Yes	Yes	Yes	Planned	Yes	Planned	Yes	Yes
Single or multi-case MAPPPs	Multi	Multi	Multi	Single	Single	Single	Multi	Single
One or two tier case related panels	Two	One	Two	Two	Two	Two	One	Two
Chaired by police or probation or jointly funded post	Police	Police	Jointly funded post	Probation	Police	Police	Police	Probation
Admin police, probation or joint funded	Police	Police	Joint funded	Probation	Joint	Police	Police	Joint
Focusing on the critical few	No	No	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Supervising officers usually attend MAPPP	No	No	Yes	Yes	No	Yes	Yes	Yes